epistemological shift pros and cons

epistemological shift pros and cons. Philosophers concern on epistemological shift - Eddusaver Pros and cons of epistemology shift Changes in epistemology even though they have received several criticisms they have significantly played a critical role in the advancement of technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. epistemological shift - porosity.ca The Epistemological Shift from Descartes to Nietzsche: Intuition and In particular, how we might define expertise and who has it. Criticizes the claim that understanding-why should be identified with strong cognitive achievement. Boston: Routledge, 2013. The idea of grasping* is useful insofar as it makes clearer the cognitive feat involved in intelligibility, which is similar to understanding in the sense that it implies a grasping of order, pattern and connection between propositions (Riggs, 2004), but it does not require those propositions to be true. . Bradford, G. The Value of Achievements. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(2) (2013): 204-224. Nevertheless, considering weakly factive construals of objective understanding draws attention to an important pointthat there are also interesting epistemic states in the neighborhood of understanding. He wants us to suppose that grasping has two componentsone that is a purely psychological (that is, narrow) component and one that is the actual obtaining of the state of affairs that is grasped. We can acknowledge this simply by regarding Bs understanding as, even if only marginally, relatively impoverished, rather than by claiming, implausibly, that no understanding persists in such cases. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. In this respect, then, Kvanvigs view achieves the result of a middle ground. Ginet, C. Knowledge, Perception and Memory. In this sense, the history of thought can be seen as the sometimes imperceptibly fluid, sometimes bizarre and abrupt, movements of our concepts. Another significant paper endorsing the claim that knowledge of explanations should play a vital role in our theories of understanding. However, this concern might be abated with the addition of a moderate factivity constraint (for example, the constraint discussed in section two above) that rules out cases of mere intelligibility or subjective understanding). Examines reasons to suppose that attributions of understanding are typically attributions of knowledge, understanding-why or objectual understanding. Why We Dont Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 156 (2007). On the most straightforward characterization of her proposal, one fails to possess understanding why, with respect to p, if one lacks any of the abilities outlined in (i-vi), with respect to p. Note that this is compatible with one failing to possess understanding why even if one possesses knowledge that involves, as virtue epistemologists will insist, some kinds of abilities or virtues. He claims further that this description of the case undermines the intuition that the writers lack of understanding entails the readers lack of understanding. But, the chief requirement of understanding, for him, is instead that there be the right coherence-making relations in some agents collection of information (that is, that the agent has a grasp of how all this related information fits together. Consider here an analogy: a false belief can be subjectively indistinguishable from knowledge. Description Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. For example, we might suppose an agent has a maximally complete explanation of how Michelangelos David came into existence between 1501 and 1504, what methods were used to craft it, what Michelangelos motivating reasons were at the time, how much clay was used, and so on. His view is that understanding requires the agent to, in counterfactual situations salient to the context, be able to modify their mental representation of the subject matter. We could, for convenience, use the honorific term subjective knowledge for false belief, though in doing so, we are no longer talking about knowledge in the sense that epistemologists are interested in, any more than we are when, as Allan Hazlett (2010) has drawn attention to, we say things like Trapped in the forest, I knew I was going to die; Im so lucky I was saved. Perhaps the same should be said about alleged subjective understanding: to the extent that it is convenient to refer to non-factive states of intelligibility as states of understanding, we are no longer talking about the kind of valuable cognitive achievement of interest to epistemologists. reptarium brian barczyk; new milford high school principal; salisbury university apparel store One natural place to start will be to examine the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck. However, advocates of moderate approaches to the factivity of understanding are left with some difficult questions to answer. Knowledge in a Social World. Olsson, E. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification in E. Zalta (ed. security guard 12 hour shifts aubrey pearsons oaks husband epistemological shift pros and cons. Although, many commentators suggest that understanding requires something further, that is something in additional to merely knowing a proposition or propositions, Grimm thinks we can update the knowledge of causes view so that this intuition is accommodated and explained. Argues that we should replace the main developed accounts of understanding with earlier accounts of scientific explanation. Elgin (2007), like Zagzebski, is sympathetic to a weak factivity constraint on objectual understanding, where the object of understanding is construed as a fairly comprehensive, coherent body of information (2007: 35). So, understanding is compatible with a kind of epistemic luck that knowledge excludes. The agents belief is justified and true, thanks to the fact that there is a genuine sheep hiding behind the rock, but the belief is not knowledge, as it could easily have been false. Grimm, S. Understanding In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds. (For example, propositions, systems, bodies of information, the relationships thereof, and so on?). Sliwa 2015, however, defends a stronger view, according to which propositional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for understanding. Such cases she claims feature intervening luck that is compatible with understanding. Endorses the idea that when we consider how things would be if something was true, we increase our access to further truths. 121-132. To borrow a case from Riggs, stealing an Olympic medal or otherwise cheating to attain it lacks the kind of value one associates with earning the medal, through ones own skill. It is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge (Rayner, 2011).The fact that taking in knowledge has altered is evident in learning institutions today. But when the object of understanding why is essentially evaluativefor example, understanding why the statue is beautifulit seems that the quality of ones understanding could vary dramatically even when we hold fixed that one possesses a correct and complete explanation of how the statue came to be (that is, both a physical and social description of these causes). Due to the possibility of overly simple or passive successes qualifying as cognitive achievements (for example, coming to truly believe that it is dark just by looking out of the window in normal conditions after 10pm), Pritchard cautions that we should distinguish between two classes of cognitive achievementstrong and weak: Weak cognitive achievement: Cognitive success that is because of ones cognitive ability. If a grasping condition is necessary for understanding, does one satisfy this condition only when one exercises a grasping ability to reflect how things are in the world? The possession of such judgment plausibly lines up more closely with ability possession (that is, (i)-(vi)) than with propositional attitude possession. If Pritchard is right to claim that understanding is always a strong cognitive achievement, then understanding is always finally valuable if cognitive achievement is also always finally valuable, and moreover, valuable in a way that knowledge is not. To this end, the first section offers an overview of the different types of understanding discussed in the literature, though their features are gradually explored in more depth throughout later sections. For example, Carter and Gordon (2011) consider that there might be cases in which understanding, and not just knowledge, is the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. His central claim in his recent work is that understanding can be viewed as knowledge of causes, though appreciating how he is thinking of this takes some situating, given that the knowledge central to understanding is non-propositional. by | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director If this is right, then at least one prominent case used to illustrate a luck-based difference between knowledge and understanding does not hold up to scrutiny. However, Pritchard (2014) responds to Grimms latest proposal with a number of criticisms. But in this version of the case, suppose that, although the book is entirely authoritative, genuine and reliable, it is the only trustworthy book on the Comanche on the shelvesevery book on the shelves nearby, which she easily could have grabbed rather than the genuine authoritative book, was filled with rumors and ungrounded suppositions. epistemological shift pros and cons - consultoresayc.co However, epistemologists have recently started to turn more attention to the epistemic state or states of understanding, asking questions about its nature, relationship to knowledge, connection with explanation, and potential status as a special type of cognitive achievement. Regarding factivity, then, it seems there is room for a view that occupies the middle ground here. Considers some of the ramifications that active externalist approaches might have for epistemology. Firstly, Wilkenfelds context-sensitive approach is in tension with a more plausible diagnosis of the example just considered: rather than to withhold attributing understanding in the case where the student is surrounded by experts, why notinsteadand in a way that is congruous with the earlier observation that understanding comes in degreesattribute understanding to the student surrounded by experts, but to a lesser degree (for example, Tim has some understanding of physics, while the professor has a much more complete understanding). Although a range of epistemologists highlighting some of the important features of understanding-why and objectual understanding have been discussed, there are many interesting topics that warrant further research. In this respect, it seems Kelps move against the manipulationist might get off the ground only if certain premises are in play which manipulationists as such would themselves be inclined to resist. Understanding entails that such beliefs must be the result of exercising reliable cognitive abilities. Defends views that hold explanation as indispensable for account of understanding and discusses what a non-factive account of grasping would look like. This point aligns with the datum that we often attribute understanding by degrees. A more sophisticated understanding has it that human beings and the other great apes descended from a common hominid ancestor (who was not, strictly speaking, an ape). facebook android official. This leaves us, however, with an interesting question about the point at which there is no understanding at all, rather than merely weaker or poorer understanding. As will see, a good number of epistemologists would agree that false beliefs are compatible with understanding. ), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Take first the object question. Discusses and defines ability in the sense often appealed to in work on cognitive ability and the value of knowledge. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology - 1280 Words | Cram Thirdly, even if one accepts something like a moderate factivity requirement on objectual understandingand thus demand of at least a certain class of beliefs one has of a subject matter that they be trueone can also ask further and more nuanced questions about the epistemic status of these true beliefs. For example, he attempts to explain the intuitions in Pritchards intervening luck spin on Kvanvigs Comanche case by noting that some of the temptation to deny understanding here relates to the writer of the luckily-true book himself lacking the relevant understanding. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. This allows the agent to produce a slightly different mental representation of the subject matter that enables efficacious inferences pertaining to (or manipulations of) the subject matter. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. To the extent that such a move is available, one has reason to resist Morriss rationale for resisting Pritchards diagnosis of Kvanvigs case. Her key thought here is that grasping the truth can actually impede the chances of ones attaining understanding because such a grasp might come at too high a cognitive cost. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Epistemological Problems of Perception - Stanford Encyclopedia of Hills, A. (vi) an ability to give q (the right explanation) when given the information p. In fact, he claims, the two come apart in both directions: yielding knowledge without strong cognitive achievement andas in the case of understanding that lacks corresponding knowledgestrong cognitive achievement without knowledge. This is explained in the following way: If it is central to ordinary cognitive function that one is motivated to pursue X, then X has value in virtue of its place in this functional story. Regarding the comparison between the value of understanding and the value of knowledge, then, he will say that if understanding is fundamental to curiosity then this provides at least a partial explanation for why it is superior to the value of knowledge. and (ii) what qualifies a group of beliefs as a system in the sense that is at issue when it is claimed that understanding involves grasping relationships or connections within a system of beliefs? However, it is less clear at least initially that retreating from causal dependence to more general dependence will be of use in the kinds of objectual understanding cases noted above. Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx - Running head: SHIFT IN For example, Kvanvig (2003) holds that understanding is particularly valuable in part because it requires a special grasp of explanatory and other coherence-making relationships. Riggs (2003: 20) agrees, stating that understanding of a subject matter requires a deep appreciation, grasp or awareness of how its parts fit together, what role each one plays in the context of the whole, and of the role it plays in the larger scheme of things (italics added). This holds regardless of whether we are Platonists or nominalists about such entities. If Kelps thought experiment works, manipulation of representations cannot be a necessary condition of understanding after all. Secondly, there is plenty of scope for understanding to play a more significant role in social epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. ), Epistemic Value. Put generally, according to the coherentist family of proposals of the structure of justified belief, a belief or set of beliefs is justified, or justifiably held, just in case the belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent system, or some variation on these themes (Olsson 2012: 1). Epistemology is the study of sources of knowledge. In his article "A Seismic Shift in Epistemology" (2008), Chris Dede draws a distinction between classical perceptions of knowledge and the approach to knowledge underpinning Web 2.0 activity. As it were, from the inside, these can be indistinguishable much as, from the first-person perspective, mere true belief and knowledge can be indistinguishable. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. It is helpful to consider an example. Whitcomb, D. Epistemic Value In A. Cullison (ed. Zagzebski, L. Recovering Understanding In M. Steup (ed. As Lackey thinks students can come to know evolutionary theory from this teacher despite the teacher not knowing the propositions she asserts (given that the Stella fails the belief condition for knowledge), we might likewise think, and contra Morris, that Stella might fail to understand evolution. Eds. Much of the philosophical tradition has viewed the central epistemological problems concerning perception largely and sometimes exclusively in terms of the metaphysical responses to skepticism. On the one hand, we have manipulationists, who think understanding involves an ability (or abilities) to manipulate certain representations or concepts. The Epistemology Shift: Embrace The Change - GradesFixer Grimm (2012) has wondered whether this view might get things explanatorily backwards. Armed with this distinction, Pritchard criticizes Kvanvigs assessment of the Comanche case by suggesting that just how we should regard understanding as being compatible or incompatible with epistemic luck depends on how we fill out the details of Kvanvigs case, which is potentially ambiguous between two kinds of readings. Riggs (2003: 21-22) asks whether an explanation has to be true to provide understanding, and Strevens thinks that it is implied that grasping is factive. Since, for instance, the ideal gas law (for example, Elgin 2007) is recognized as a helpful fiction and is named and taught as such, as is, nave Copernicanism or the simple view that humans evolved from apes. Epistemology is the study nature of human knowledge itself. However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. Longworth, G. Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge. Nous 42 (2008): 50-79. A view on which the psychics epistemic position in this case qualifies as understanding-why would be unsatisfactorily inclusive. Thirdly, Kelp (2015) has an objection that he thinks all who favor a manipulationist line should find worrying. For the purposes of thinking about understanding, some of the most important will include: (i) what makes a system of beliefs coherent? For example, we might require that the agent make sense of X in a way that is reasonablefew would think that the psychic above is reasonable, though it is beyond the scope of the current discussion to stray into exploring accounts of reasonableness. If, as robust virtue epistemologists have often insisted, cognitive achievement is finally valuable (that is, as an instance of achievements more generally), and understanding necessarily lines up with cognitive achievement but knowledge only sometimes does, then the result is a revisionary story about epistemic value. The group designated explanationists by Kelp (2015) share a general commitment to the idea that knowledge of explanations should play a key role in a theory of understanding (for example, Hempel 1965; Salmon 1989; Khalifa 2012; 2013). London: Routledge, 2009. Lackey, J. Kvanvig stipulates that there are no falsehoods in the relevant class of beliefs that this individual has acquired from the book, and also that she can correctly answer all relevant questions whilst confidently believing that she is expressing the truth. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Carter, J. Grasping also allows the understander to anticipate what would happen if things were relevantly differentnamely, to make correct inferences about the ways in which relevant differences to the truth-values of the involved propositions would influence the inferences that obtain in the actual world. Wilkenfeld suggests that this ability consists at least partly in being able to correct minor mistakes in ones mental representation and use it to make assessments in similar cases. Elgin, C. Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 33-42. A. and Pritchard, D. Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck. Nos (2013). Secondly, one might wonder if Wilkenfelds account of understanding as representation manipulation is too inclusivethat it rules in, as cases of bona fide understanding, representations that are based on inaccurate but internally consistent beliefs. It is clearly cognitively better than the belief that humans did not evolve. So too does the fact that one would rather have a success involving an achievement than a mere success, even when this difference has no pragmatic consequences. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979. al 2014), have for understanding? The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology - Internet Public Library And, relatedly in social epistemology, we might wonder what if any testimonial transmission principles hold for understanding, and whether there are any special hearer conditions demanded by testimonial understanding acquisition that are not shared in cases of testimonial knowledge acquisition. Claims that understanding is entirely compatible with both intervening and environmental forms of veritic luck. More generally, as this line of criticism goes, sometimes we simply mistake mere (non-factive) intelligibility for understanding. The following sections consider why understanding might have such additional value. The childs opinion displays some grasp of evolution. There are three potential worries with this general style of approach. If so, why, and if not why not? Hills thinks that moral understanding, if it were any kind of propositional knowledge at all, would be knowing a proposition under a practical mode and not necessarily under a theoretical mode.. However, Strevens nonetheless offers a rough outline of a parallel, non-factive account of grasping, what he calls grasping*. The underlying idea in play here is that, in short, thinking about how things would be if it were true is an efficacious way to get to further truths; an insight has attracted endorsement in the philosophy of science (for example, Batterman 2009). However, such a strong view would also make understanding nearly unobtainable and surely very rarefor example, on the extremely strong proposal under consideration, recognized experts in a field would be denied understanding if they had a single false belief about some very minor aspect of the subject matter. Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics 120 (2009): 94-127. Given the extent to which grasping is highly associated with understanding and left substantively unspecified, it is perhaps unsurprising that the matter of how to articulate grasping-related conditions on understanding has proven to be rather divisive. Specifically, a very weak view of understandings factivity does not fit with the plausible and often expressed intuition that understanding is something especially epistemically valuable. In terms of parallels with the understanding debate, it is important to note that the knowledge of causes formula is not limited to the traditional propositional reading. However, the core explanationist insight also offers the resources to supplement a grasping account. Grimm (2014) also notes that his modal view of understanding fits well with the idea that understanding involves a kind of ability or know-how, as one who sees or grasps how certain propositions are modally related has the ability to answer a wide variety of questions about how things could have been different. In the first version, we are to imagine that the agent gets her beliefs from a faux-academic book filled with mere rumors that turn out to be luckily true. It focuses on means of human knowledge acquisition and how to differentiate the truth knowledge claims from the false one. epistemological shift pros and cons - hashootrust.org.pk Utilize at least 2 credible sources to support the arguments presented in the paper. In such a case, Kvanvig says, this individual acquires an historical understanding of the Comanche dominance of the Southern plains of North America from the late 17th until the late 19th century (2003: 197). Kvanvig (2013) claims that both of these views are mistaken, and in the course of doing so, locates curiosity at the center of his account of understandings value. With a wide range of subtly different accounts of understanding (both objectual and understanding-why) on the table, it will be helpful to consider how understanding interfaces with certain key debates in epistemology. This objection is worth holding in mind when considering any further positions that incorporate representation manipulability as necessary. If making reasonable sense merely requires that some event or experience make sense to the epistemic agent herself, Bakers view appears open, as Grimm (2011) has suggested, to counterexamples according to which an agent knows that something happened and yet accounts for that occurrence by way of a poorly supported theory. Abstract. He suggests that the primary object of a priori knowledge is the modal reality itself that is grasped by the mind and that on this basis we go on to assent to the proposition that describes these relationships. Hills thinks that mere propositional knowledge does not essentially involve any of these abilities even if (as per the point above) propositional knowledge requires other kinds of abilities. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Specifically, he takes his opponents view to be that knowledge through direct experience is what sates curiosity, a view that traces to Aristotle. Looks at understandings role in recent debates about epistemic value and contains key arguments against Elgins non-factive view of understanding. More specifically, Kvanvig aims to support the contention that objectual understanding has a special value knowledge lacks by arguing that the nature of curiositythe motivational element that drives cognitive machinery (2013: 152)underwrites a way of vindicating understandings final value. 1. Her main supporting example is of understanding the rate at which objects in a vacuum fall toward the earth (that is, 32 feet per second), a belief that ignores the gravitational attraction of everything except the earth and so is therefore not true. View Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. epistemological shift pros and cons - kaminokawa-shokokai.net Consider, for instance, the felicity of the question: Am I understanding this correctly? and I do not know if I understand my own defense mechanisms; I think I understand them, but I am not sure. The other side of the coin is that one often can think that one understands things that one does not (for example, Trout 2007). Riaz, A. Nevertheless, distinguishing between the two in this manner raises some problems for her view of objectual understanding, which should be unsurprising given the aforementioned counterexamples that can be constructed against a non-factive reading of Bakers construal of understanding-why. That is, we often describe an individual as having a better understanding of a subject matter than some other person, perhaps when choosing whom to approach for advice or when looking for someone to teach us about a subject. Khalifa, K. Inaugurating understanding or repackaging explanation. This is of course an unpalatable result, as we regularly attribute understanding in the presence of not just one, but often many, false beliefs. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift Epistemology refers to a dynamic concept that shows how humans understand knowledge, which entails how it is received, classified, justified, and transmitted in distinctive ways and at different periods in history. For example, in Whitcomb (2011) we find the suggestion that theoretical wisdom is a form of particularly deep understanding. That said, Grimms more recent work (2014) expands on these earlier observations to form the basis of a view that spells out grasping in terms of a modal relationship between properties, objects or entitiesa theory on which what is grasped when one has understanding-why will be how changes in one would lead (or fail to lead) to changes in the other. Though the demandingness of this ability need not be held fixed across practical circumstances. He concedes, though, that sometimes curiosity on a smaller scale can be sated by epistemic justification, and that what seems like understanding, but is actually just intelligibility, can sate the appetite when one is deceived. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology - 824 Words | Bartleby

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epistemological shift pros and cons